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BLETHEN MAINE NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. STATE:
BALANCING THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW
AGAINST THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF VICTIMS OF
SEXUAL ABUSE
Kenleigh Nicoletta·

I. INTRODUCTION
In Blethen Maine Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 1 a sharply divided Maine Supreme
Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, held that release of records relating to
Attorney General G. Steven Rowe's investigation ofalleged sexual abuse by Catholic
priests was warranted under Maine's Freedom of Access Act (FOAA). 2 Although such
investigative records are designated confidential by statute,3 the majority held that the
public's interest in the contents of the records mandated their disclosure after all
information identifying persons other than the deceased priests had been redacted. 4
The concurrence asserted that the majority had reached the correct conclusion, but in
so doing had unnecessarily expanded the underlying purpose of the FOAA. 5 The two
dissents both found, however, that release of the records was not warranted in this case,
both because it compromised the personal privacy interests of the victims, deceased
priests, and their families, and because there was no public interest falling within the
purpose of the FOAA compelling disclosure; 6 The dissents also found fault with the
redaction standard adopted by the majority. 7
This case required the Law Court to interpret for the first time the personal privacy
exemption of the FOAA relating to investigative records. In so doing, the Law Court
was confronted with unique legal, political, and cultural issues relating to crimes of
sexual abuse in the context of a priest abuse scandal. The Law Court determined that
the public had a right to view the records, once the identifying information of the
victims and witnesses named in the reports had been redacted, as a way of understanding the Attorney General's response to the numerous reports of sexual abuse by
Maine priests. The question now becomes: did the Law Court craft a holding that

* J .D. Candidate, 2007, University of Maine School of Law. The author wishes to thank her family
for all their love and support.
I. 2005 ME 56, 871 A.2d 523.
2. ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit. 1, §§ 401-10 (1989 & Supp. 2005).
3. ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit. I 6, § 614( I )(C)( l 989)("Reports or records that contain intelligence and
investigative information and that are prepared by, prepared at the direction of or kept in the custody of ...
the Department of the Attorney General ... are confidential.").
4. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,i 40,871 A.2d at 535.
5. See id. ,i 41, 871 A.2d at 536 (Saufley, C.J., concurring).
6. Id. ,i 51, 871 A.2d at 538 (Clifford, J., dissenting); Id. ,i 70, 871 A.2d at 542 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting).
7. Id. ,i 58, 871 A.2d at 540 (Clifford, J., dissenting); Id. ,i 75, 871 A.2d at 543 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting).
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would adequately protect the privacy interests of victims and alleged perpetrators of
crimes while also preserving the public's right to access government records?
This Note first explains the history of the Maine FOAA as well as the Federal
Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA), and the public policies underlying each Act. The
Note examines the provisions in both the FOAA and the FOIA that exempt investigative records from disclosure where such disclosure would constitute an invasion of
personal privacy. Through an analysis of the landmark federal cases interpreting this
personal privacy exemption, this Note explains the difficult and conflicting interests
implicated by this exemption, and the divergent views of courts in the application of
these precedents. This Note shows how the conflicting interests of private individuals
and the general public came into play in the Blethen decision, and how the Law Court
balanced these interests in reaching its decision to release the records. After examining
the conclusions reached by the various opinions in the case, this Note concludes that
the Law Court reached the right decision in releasing the records and declining to
adopt a more rigorous test for public interest. However, the court failed to craft a
redaction standard that would adequately ensure, in future cases, that any personal
privacy interests of those named in such records would be protected from unwarranted
public disclosure.
II. HISTORYOFMAINE'SFOAA

AND

THEFEDERALFOIA

Maine's original freedom of information act was passed in I 959 and was
commonly known as the Right to Know Act. 8 Under this act, access to public records
in Maine was expansive and included only limited statutory exceptions to disclosure. 9
However, in 1975, the Right to Know Act was drastically amended; the result was the
first version of Maine's current Freedom of Access Act (FOAA). 10 The FOAA
contains a declaration of the public policy behind the act as well as rules of construction. 11 The first section of the FOAA provides:
The Legislature finds and declares that public proceedings exist to aid in the conduct
of the people's business. It is the intent of the Legislature that their actions be taken
openly and that the records of their actions be open to public inspection and their
deliberations be conducted openly .... This [Act] shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies as contained in the
declaration of legislative intent. 12

In addition, the FOAA also provides that "[ e ]xcept as otherwise provided by statute,
every person has the right to inspect and copy any public record during the regular
business hours of the agency or official having custody of the public record." 13 These
sections of the FOAA establish a presumption in favor of disclosure of public records,

8. P.L. 1959, ch. 219. See Anne C. Lucey, A Section-by-Section Analysis of Maine's Freedom of
Access Act, 43 ME. L. REV. 169, 169, 170 n.5 (1991).
9. Lucey, supra note 8, at 169.
10. P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified as amended at ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. I,§§ 401-410 (1989 & Supp.
2005).
11. ME. REV.STAT.ANN. tit. I,§ 401 {1989).
12. Id.
13. ME. REV.STAT.ANN. tit. I,§ 408(1) (Supp. 2005).
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with the burden of establishing that a document fits within an exception to disclosure
falling upon the agency seeking to withhold the information. The FOAA therefore
recognizes that a democracy functions best when the general public is informed about
the actions of its govemment. 14
However, since its enactment, it has become clear that this right to view government records under the FOAA is not absolute. There are more than one hundred
statutory exceptions to disclosure found within either the FOAA itself or within state
statutes that designate specific records confidential. 15 In light of the liberal rules of
construction contained in the first section of the Act, however, Maine courts have
acknowledged that any exceptions to disclosure must be interpreted narrowly in order
to further the Act's policy of disclosure. 16
The first Federal Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) was passed on July 4, 1966,
seven years after Maine's Right to Know Act. 17 Although the FOIA does not contain
a broad statement oflegislative intent, the legislative history of the Act is replete with
statements exalting "a broad policy of full disclosure based on American democratic
theory and a philosophy of open government. " 18 Therefore, like the FOAA, the FOIA
favors disclosure of public records. However, the original 1966 FOIA was extremely
weak and "might almost have [been] written off as a paper tiger" had it not been
strengthened by later amendments. 19
In 1974, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, 2°Congress made three substantial
changes to the FOIA meant to allow citizens greater access to government records. 21

14. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and
Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORYL.J. 649,652 (1984) (quoting Lydon 8. Johnson,
Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Revising Public information Provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, WEEKLYCOMP.PRES.Doc. 895 (July 4, 1966)).
15. Lucey, supra note 8, at 169. The Maine Freedom of Access Act provides that the term "public
records," and hence the Act itself, does not apply to any "[ r]ecords that have been designated confidential
by statute." ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. I, § 402(3)(A) (Supp. 2005).
16. See Moffett v. Portland, 400 A.2d 340, 348 (Me. 1979) ("[A] corollary to such liberal construction
of the [FOAA] is necessarily a strict construction of any exceptions to the required public disclosure.").
See also Guy Gannet Publ'g Co. v. Univ. of Me., 555 A.2d 470,471 (Me. 1989)(citing the Moffett rule);
Bangor Publ'g Co. v. City of Bangor, 544 A.2d 733, 736 (Me. 1988) (same); Wiggins v. McDevitt, 473
A.2d 420,423 (Me. 1984) (same).
17. Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5
u.s.c.§ 552 (2000)).
18. Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest be Damned: Lower Court Treatment
of the Reporters Committee "Central Purpose" Reformulation, 54 ADMIN.L. REV.983,991 (2002). See
also Wald, supra note 14, at 652 ("A government by secrecy benefits no one. It injures the people it seeks
to serve; it damages its own integrity and operation. It breeds distrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens
and mocks their loyalty." (quoting Edward V. Long, 110 Cong. Rec. 17087 (1964))).
19. Wald, supra note 14, at 658.
20. Id. at 659. The Watergate scandal exposed high-level government cover-ups, covert activities and
numerous invocations by President Nixon of the executive privilege, all resulting in public indignation
against secrecy in government. Id. As a result, "Watergate created a vacuum into which demands for FOIA
reform flooded." Id.
21. See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 ( I 974) for the text of the postWatergate amendments.

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 238 2007

2007]

BALANCING THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW

239

Most notable was the change to the investigatory record exemption. 22 Whereas the
earlier version of the FOIA provided that the prohibition against release of
investigatory records was all but absolute, 23 the 1974 FOIA provided that the
exemption applied only when certain harmful consequences, such as an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, would result from disclosure. 24 The amended FOIA
resulted in a flood of FOIA demands upon government, and the accrual of resultant
costs, leading Antonin Scalia to call the Act "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of
Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost Benefit Analysis Ignored. " 25
However, although Congress has sought to make government records more accessible
with these later amendments to the FOIA, the Act is still full of oft-invoked exemptions
to disclosure. 26
Both the FOAA and the FOIA were passed with the broad acknowledgement that,
in a democracy, the public must have the right to examine the activities of its government and hold it accountable. 27 However, such broad disclosure of government
activities was not meant to interfere with the equally fundamental right of private
citizens to their personal privacy. 28 It is in light of this tension that all FOAA and
FOIA cases must be decided.
III. PERSONAL PRIVACY EXEMPTIONS AND THE CENTRAL PURPOSE DOCTRINE

A. The Personal Privacy Exemptions of the FOAA and FOJA and the
Reporters Committee Case
Both the FOAA and the FOIA contain provisions exempting from disclosure
records held by a law enforcement agency where disclosure might constitute an
unwa"anted invasion of personal privacy. 29 The Federal Act's personal privacy

22. Id. Investigatory records are defined in the FOIA as "records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000).
23. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 55 (1967). This amendment to the 1966
version of the FOIA specified that the Act did not apply to "investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency."
24. Id. § 552(b )(7). The two other amendments passed in 1974 imposed mandatory time limits of ten
to thirty days upon agencies to respond to FOIA requests and authorized courts to review the propriety of
the classification of documents by government agencies and to review such documents in camera when
making this determination. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 156 I ( I 974).
25. Wald, supra note 14, at 664 (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No
Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14-15).
Clothes, REGULATION,
26. See, e.g., id at 679 n.124 (discussing the "convoluted history" of Exemption 3, which allows other
statutes to trump FOIA's policy of disclosure under certain circumstances).
27. See Federal Freedom of Information Act's bill-signing statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson
on July 4, 1966, quoted in H.R. REP.No. 92-1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at I ("[A] democracy works
best when the people have all the information that the security of the nation permits. No one should be able
to pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public
interest."). Like the FOIA, Maine's FOAA was "intended to address the public's right to hold the
government accountable." Blethen Maine Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, ,r31,871 A.2d 523,533
(citing ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. I,§ 401 (1989)).
28. See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 (stating
that the purpose of the FOIA is "not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is
accumulated in various government files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct").
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000); ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit. 16, § 614(!)(C) (1989).
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exemption provides that the disclosure rules do not apply to "records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of
such law enforcement records or information ... (C) could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. " 30 The Maine counterpart to
this exemption is found in the Maine Criminal History Record Information Act
(Criminal Record Act), which provides, in pertinent part:
Reports or records that contain intelligence and investigative information and that are
prepared by, prepared at the direction of or kept in the custody of ... the Department
of the Attorney General ... are confidential and may not be disseminated if there is
a reasonable possibility that public release or inspection of the reports or records
would: ... C. Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 31

Exactly what constitutes an unwarranted invasion of privacy lies at the heart of all
cases addressing the privacy exemptions of both the Maine and Federal Acts. Maine
courts have acknowledged that where a provision of the FOAA contains the same or
similar language as a provision in the FOIA, such as the personal privacy exemption,
Maine courts should use the framework laid down by Federal case law on the subject. 32
Accordingly, an examination of Federal case law interpreting the personal privacy
exemption is necessary prior to an examination of the Blethen decision.
The landmark Supreme Court case addressing the personal privacy exemption of
the FOIA (Exemption 7(C)) is United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press. 33 In this case, a CBS news correspondent and
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press requested disclosure by the FBI of
the criminal identification records, 34 commonly known as "rap sheets," of members of
a notorious organized crime family, the Medicos. 35 The FBI originally denied the
requests, but then released the rap sheets of the three deceased members of the Medico

30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7XC) (2000).
31. ME. REV.STAT.ANN. tit. 16, § 614(l)(C) (1989). The privacy exemption of the Criminal History
Record Information Act is applicable to the FOAA based upon I M.R.S.A. § 402(3)(A), the confidential
records exemption to disclosure. See supra note 15.
32. Campbell v. Town of Machias, 661 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Me. 1995) ("Cases arising under the federal
act are useful in analyzing the scope of Maine's act."). See also Bangor Publ'g Co. v. Town of Bucksport,
682 A.2d 227, 229-30(Me. 1996); Med. Mut. Ins. Co. ofMe. v. Me. Bureau of Ins., No. CV03-453, 2003
WL 23 I 85888, at • I (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2003).
33. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
34. Criminal identification records compiled by the FBI include "certain descriptive information, such
as date of birth and physical characteristics, as well as a history of arrests, charges, convictions, and
incarcerations of the subject." Id. at 752. The Court further explained that because of the volume of these
records, they often contain incorrect or incomplete information. Id.
35. Id. at 7 57. The Medicos operated Medico Industries, an allegedly legitimate Pennsylvania business
dominated by organized crime figures. Id. The reporters sought disclosure of information concerning the
Medicos, including their rap sheets, as part of an investigation of allegations of corruption against former
Pennsylvania Congressman Daniel J. Flood. Halstuk & Davis, supra note 18, at 988. Specifically, the
journalists believed that Medico Industries obtained a number of defense contracts in exchange for illegal
political contributions they allegedly gave to Representative Flood. Id. Representative Flood eventually
resigned from office while under indictment in 1980, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate federal
campaign laws, and was convicted of conspiracy to solicit campaign contributions from persons seeking
federal government contracts. Id.
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family. 36 However, the FBI declined to release information pertaining to Charles
Medico because he was still alive and the Bureau believed that disclosure of his rap
sheet was not required under the FOIA because it would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy. 37
In upholding the FBI's conclusion that dissemination of Medico's rap sheet
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, the Court enunciated a
number of guidelines that continue to be the bedrock of case law interpreting Exemption 7(C). First, in response to the Reporters Committee's argument that prior public
disclosure of the information in the records extinguished any privacy right Medico had
in the information, 38 the Court made a distinction between scattered disclosure of the
individual bits of information that make up an FBI rap sheet and disclosure of an FBI
rap sheet as a whole. 39 Although bits of information concerning a private individual's
criminal history may have, at one time, been public, they usually cease to be "freely
available" shortly thereafter. 40 The Court therefore concluded that the FOIA was not
intended to transform government agencies into "clearinghouses" ofinformation about
private citizens, and to hold that disclosure of government compilations of information
41
about private citizens such as rap sheets was warranted in this case would do just that.
Next, the Court articulated a simple, yet enduring, balancing test to determine
whether disclosure of the records was warranted. 42 The Court found that application
of Exemption 7(C) required it to "balance the privacy interest in maintaining ... the
43
'practical obscurity' of the rap sheets against the public interest in their release. "
Only when the public interest in disclosure of such records outweighs the privacy
interests of individuals would disclosure be warranted.
In working through this balancing test, the Court laid down three principles that
have been used by federal courts ever since to evaluate whether disclosure of records
falling under the Exemption 7( C) is warranted. 44 First, "whether disclosure ofa private
document under Exemption 7(C) is warranted must tum on the nature of the requested
document and its relationship to the basic purpose of the Freedom oflnformation Act
'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny. "' 45 Second, the Court explained:
[W]hen the subject of a [record] is a private citizen and when the information is in the
Government's control as a compilation, rather than as a record of 'what the

36. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757.
37. See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 18, at 988 (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757).
38. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762-63.
39. Id. at 764.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 762.
43. Id. The term "practical obscurity" refers to the Court's view that despite the fact that the individual
pieces of information that make up a rap sheet may all be available to the public, the process of tracking
all such information down and compiling it often would have been extremely difficult. See id. at 764.
44. Id. at 772-80. See Christopher P. Beall, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines Over Public
Information Law, 45 DUKE L.J. 1249, 1255 (1996); Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the
Public's Right to Know: The "Central Purpose" of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN.L REV.
41, 44-45 (1994); Halstuk & Davis, supra note 18, at 987.
45. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772 (quoting Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,372 (1976)).
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Government is up to,' the privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) is in fact at
its apex while the FOIA-based public interest in disclosure is at its nadir. 46

Finally, the Court held that, "as a categorical matter," when a request does not seek
information about the actions of a government agency but only records that the
government happens to be storing that pertain to private individuals, the invasion of
privacy is unwarranted. 47 Thus, in Reporters Committee, because the journalists were
not seeking information pertaining to government action, but only information about
a private citizen, release ofMedico 's rap sheet would clearly constitute an unwarranted
invasion of privacy. 48
B. The Central Purpose Doctrine

The three principles established in Reporters Committee addressing when disclosure is warranted gave rise to what is now known as the "central purpose
doctrine. " 49 This doctrine has become a "unifying ideology" for courts in interpreting
the FOIA and has come to stand for the proposition that the FOIA is meant to protect
citizens' rights to know "what their government is up to," in order to find out whether
their government is acting according to their wishes. 50 However, according to
Reporters Committee, the Act was not meant to include the right of a citizen to gain
access to information about private individuals that just happens to be in government
files. 51 In other words, the Act should be viewed as a means to an end, but not an end
itself. 52 Although some scholars argue for a broader applicability, 53 the central purpose
doctrine has only been applied in cases addressing the two personal privacy exemptions of the FOIA: Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6, which provides an exemption
from disclosure for "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. " 54

46. Id. at 780.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. For a detailed discussion of how the Reporters Committee case gave rise to the "central purpose
doctrine" and its resultant effects, see Beall, supra note 44. Beall explains that although the Court in
Reporters Committee never specifically identified the doctrine by this name, it did intend that the three
principles outlined in the opinion were meant to be "a way of interpreting the asserted congressional
intentions underlying the FOIA." Id. at 1255.
50. Id. at 1255, 1258.
51. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 765.
52. Beall, supra note 44, at 1258.
53. Compare Cate et al., supra note 44, at 45-46 (arguing that the central purpose analysis should be
extended to all records held by the government and thus only those records that would serve the central
purpose of the FOIA should ever be subject to disclosure under the act), with Beall, supra note 44, at 1262
(arguing that expanding the central purpose doctrine to areas outside of the privacy exemptions "would
work a dramatic volte face from the principles ofFOIA, improperly shifting the Act from one that favors
disclosure to one that favors secrecy"), and Halstuk & Davis, supra note 18, at I 024 (indicating that use
by lower courts of the central purpose doctrine in contexts other than the privacy exemptions circumvents
the legislative intent of presumptive openness that is the basic principle of the FOIA and "substitutes
judicial prerogative for legislative fact-finding").
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000). Subsequent to Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court has noted
that the only substantive difference in analysis between Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6 is that Exemption
6 places a higher burden upon the government in denying disclosure. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray,

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 242 2007

2007]

BALANCING THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW

243

The central purpose doctrine effected a drastic change in the way courts interpreted the FOIA, especially with respect to the personal privacy exemptions. 55
Although the FOIA had previously been regarded as a statute that established a
presumption in favor of disclosure of government records, the central purpose doctrine
served to reverse the burden of proof in those cases falling under Exemptions 6 and
7(C) of the FOIA, putting it upon the party seeking disclosure of such records.

C. Cases Applying the Central Purpose Doctrine
Subsequent to Reporters Committee, the United States Supreme Court has had
three opportunities to revisit, and reaffirm, the applicability of the central purpose
doctrine to cases falling under the FOIA's personal privacy exemptions. 56 In United
States Department of State v. Ray, respondents, who were Haitian nationals, sought the
release of reports of interviews conducted by State Department personnel with other
Haitians who had been involuntarily returned to Haiti by the United States. 57 The
reports were released with the names of interviewees and identifying information
redacted. 58 In reversing the lower court's decision that it was improper for the State
Department to have redacted identifying information ofinterviewees in the documents
they released, the Supreme Court stated that the FOIA explicitly authorized redaction
in such situations where identifying information would not serve to further inform
citizens about the operation of government. 59 Thus, redaction was one way that the
legislature sought to enable government to "balance the public's right to know with the
private citizen's right to be secure in his personal affairs which have no bearing or
effect on the general public." 60
Respondents argued that release of the identifying information of individual
interviewees would allow them to pursue additional information that might shed light
on government action; thus, the identifying information could be used derivatively to
inform citizens about the government's performance. 61 This, argued respondents,

502 U.S. 164, 172 (1991). Under Exemption 6, the government must establish that disclosure "would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," while under Exemption 7(C), the
government must only establish that release "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6),(7)(C) (2000) (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., Halstuk & Davis, supra note 18, at 995-96 ("[The] 'central purpose' test represents an
alarming instance of judicial activism, with the Supreme Court having rewritten legislation in order to
constrict the ambit of the FOIA's statutory purpose ... critically impairing the ability of requesters to
receive government information."); Beall, supra note 44, at 1279-80 ("The essential operation of the central
purpose doctrine reestablishes a presumption in favor of nondisclosure, contrary to the original spirit of
FOIA.").
56. U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991); U.S. Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
510 U.S. 487 (1993); Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004). Although both
Ray and Federal Labor Relations deal with Exemption 6 of the FOIA, the Court has made it clear that the
central purpose doctrine is equally applicable to both Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6. See Cate et al.,
supra note 44, at 44-45.
57. Ray, 502 U.S. at 168.
58. Id. at 169.
59. Id. at 174 (citing the discussion of redaction in Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 n.7 (1989)).
60. Id. at 174 n.10 (quoting S. Rep. No. 89-813 at 7 (1965)).
61. Id. at 178. In his concurrence in Ray, Justice Scalia found fault with the majority's decision not
to explicitly reject respondent's derivative use theory in Ray, and also with its use of a derivative theory in
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would increase the public interest in release of the information and bring it more
squarely within the central purpose of the FOIA, a contention the Court found
unsupportable in this case. 62 Although the Court did not find such an argument
compelling in this case, it did not adopt a rigid rule against such a "derivative use"
theory to justify the release of the identifying information in such documents. 63
Similarly, in United States Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority, 64 the Supreme Court upheld redaction of employees' home addresses in
reports released by federal employment agencies. 65 In this case, two unions sought the
names and addresses of Army, Navy, and Air Force employees in order to contact them
as potential union members. 66 According to the Court, release of the addresses would
serve only to "allow the unions to communicate more effectively with employees," but
would not provide the unions with information about the actions or performance of the
government agency. 67 Thus, because the unions' request did not advance the central
purpose of the FOIA, the employees' privacy interests in their personal information
clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosure of the documents. 68
The Supreme Court's most recent decision involving the central purpose doctrine
came in National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish, 69 where the Court
for the first time addressed whether the personal privacy interest under Exemption 7(C)
extended to a decedent's family members who objected to release of photographs
showing the decedent's body. 70 In Favish, an attorney for Accuracy in Media, Allan
Favish, sought release of photographs showing the corpse ofVincent Foster, Jr., deputy
counsel to President Clinton, at the scene of his death. 71 Favish was skeptical of the
finding by five different government agencies (including the United States Park Police
and the FBI) that Foster had committed suicide. 72 The Court first sought to determine,
in accordance with Reporters Committee, whether there was even a personal privacy

evaluating the personal privacy interest at stake in the case. Id. at 180-81 (Scalia, J., concurring). In so
finding, Justice Scalia stated that "it is unavoidable that the focus, in assessing a claim under Exemption
6, must be solely upon what the requested information reveals, not upon what it might lead to." Id. at 180.
Thus, according to Justice Scalia, the majority erred when it failed to reject the derivative use theory on the
public-benefits side, but then considered the derivative effects disclosure of identifying information might
have on the personal-privacy side. Id. at 181. These derivative effects included the risk that interviewees
might face retaliation by the Haitian government ifidentified, or that their personal privacy may be invaded
by further unauthorized requests for interviews. Id. at 176-77. For further discussion of the "derivative
use" theory in Exemptions 6 and 7(C) cases and its use or rejection in district court cases, see Beall, supra
note 44, at 1264-84.
62. Id. at 178.
63. Id. at 178-79.
64. 510 U.S. 487 (1993).
65. Id. at 503.
66. Id. at 490 & nn.1-2.
67. Id. at 497.
68. See id. at 497-98.
69. 541 U.S. 157 (2004). Favish was decided prior to the Law Court's decision in Blethen, but
subsequent to the filingofbriefs by the parties. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, 1147,
871 A.2d 523, 537 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). Therefore, the parties did not present arguments addressing
the applicability of Favish to the issues in Blethen. Id.
70. Favish, 541 U.S. at 160.
71. Id. at 160-61.
72. Id at 161.
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interest at stake in the case. 73 The Court acknowledged that Foster's family was not
seeking to assert the personal privacy right on Foster's behalf; instead, Foster's
relatives claimed that the personal privacy Exemption in 7(C) secured their own right
to be shielded "from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and
tranquility." 74 The Court agreed with the family's interpretation of"personal privacy,"
stating that "[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their
dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their
own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased
person who was once their own. " 75
After finding a personal privacy interest cognizable under Exemption 7(C), the
Court proceeded to determine whether Favish's request implicated any significant
public interest in disclosure under the FOIA. 76 The Court concluded that it did not. 77
In making this determination, the Court clarified what was required of a requestor in
seeking to establish the existence of a public interest cognizable under the FOIA: first,
the requestor must show that the public interest to be advanced was more specific and
important than just general public interest or curiosity in a matter, and second, the
requestor must show that the information is likely to advance that interest. 78 The Court
declined to list the reasons that would suffice to meet the first standard, but did state
that where the facts were similar to those of Pavish, ''the justification most likely to
satisfy Exemption 7(C)'s public interest requirement is that the information is
necessary to show the investigative agency . . . acted negligently or otherwise
improperly in the performance of their duties." 79 The Court then held that where this
was the justification for release of information, the requestor would need to "produce
evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged
Government impropriety might have occurred." 80 To hold otherwise would render
Exemption 7(C) "nothing more than a rule ofpleading." 81
Pavish therefore clarified two issues pertaining to Exemption 7(C) that had
previously been unclear from or unaddressed by earlier cases. First, it established that
family members of deceased individuals named in government records could assert a
privacy interest under Exemption 7(C). 82 Second, it explicitly outlined what was

73. Id. at 164.
74. Id. at 166.
75. Id. at 168.
76. Id. at 172.
77. Id. at 175.
78. Id. at 172. The Court explained that usually, when information is requested by citizens pursuant
to the FOIA, they need not articulate a reason for disclosure. Id. However, when information falls within
an exemption such as 7(C), the presumption switches to that ofnondisclosure, with the burden now falling
upon the requestor to establish a sufficient reason for disclosure. Id.
79. Id. at 172-73. The Court never specifically mentions the central purpose doctrine in its opinion,
but this statement reaffirms that doctrine's applicability. Specifically, where a citizen requests disclosure
of information by the government under the FOIA, that information should serve the central purpose of the
FOIA as articulated in Reporters Committee: it should shed light on government activity and should not
simply reveal information about private citizens held by government agencies. See supra Part III.B.
80. Id. at 174 (citing U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 178-79 (1991); United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1996); United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. I, 14-15 (1926)).
81. Id. at 174.
82. Id. at 170.
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required of a requestor seeking disclosure ofrecords falling under Exemption 7(C): a
complaint containing clear evidence that the records requested would directly reveal
83
government conduct of interest to the public for more than just mere curiosity's sake.
Only after the requestor had made this affirmative showing would application of the
balancing test established in the Reporters Committee case be triggered. 84 However,
a number of issues were left unclear by Favish as well. First, the Court was not
required to address what steps short of complete nondisclosure of the records, such as
redaction, would be sufficient to protect the privacy interests of family members of
deceased individuals. 85 Further, the Court declined to address whether anything short
of an allegation of government misconduct would suffice as a public interest
warranting disclosure under Exemption 7(C).86 Finally, the Court did not consider the
likelihood that future requestors would be able to successfully clear the evidentiary
hurdle established by the Court in Favish, especially in cases where the only clear
87
evidence of government misconduct was the requested documents themselves.
In addition to this line of Supreme Court decisions, numerous federal district
courts have, in the years since Reporters Committee, applied and expounded on the
principles outlined in that case. 88 For the most part, district courts have interpreted and
applied the central purpose doctrine as a tool for preventing disclosure, requiring
evidence that release of the documents will directly reveal government misconduct in
order to find that release is warranted. 89 However, a limited few have found that the
90
central purpose doctrine can be used to compel disclosure. In so doing, these courts
have argued that release of certain records containing information about private
citizens may nevertheless allow individuals to determine whether government has acted
properly, thus endorsing the derivative use theory discussed in Ray. 91 In other words,

83. Id. at 174-75.
84. Id.
85. The Court did not address this issue because it found that Favish had not proffered any credible
evidence of government misconduct, and therefore held the records to be exempt from disclosure solely for
this reason. Id. at 175.
86. Id. at 172-73.
87. Id. The only guidance the Court gave on this point was its statement that "[a]llegations of
government misconduct are 'easy to allege and hard to disprove,' so courts must insist on a meaningful
evidentiary showing." Id. (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,585 (1998)).
88. See Halstuk & Davis, supra note I 8, at 996 n. 76 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers
Int'!Ass'n, Local 19 v. U.S. Dep'tofVeteranAffairs, 135 F.3d 891 (3dCir. 1998); Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 139 F.3d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1998); McQueen v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 522 (S.D. Tex. 1998);
Ligomer v. Reno, 2 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence v. U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury, 981 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. Cir. 1997); Sheet Metal Workers Int'! Ass'n, Local 9 v. U.S. Air
Force, 63 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 1995); Manna v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 5 I F.3d 1158 (3d Cir. 1994); Exner
v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 902 F. Supp. 240 (D.D.C. 1995); Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238 (6th Cir. 1994); U.S.
Dep't of the Navy v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 975 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1992); Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286
(9th Cir. 1992); Hale v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1992).
89. Beall, supra note 44, at 1280.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see Rosenfeld v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 57 F.3d 803,812 (9th Cir. 1995)(holding that release
of FBI investigation records without redacting names of investigation subjects might make it possible to
determine whether FBI acted improperly); Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 98
(6th Cir. 1996) (arguing that release ofa mug shot "can more clearly reveal the government's glaring error
in detaining the wrong person for an offense" than can a written record and thus finding that the requested
mug shots should be released).
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this minority of courts has not found that the information itself must be sought to reveal
government misconduct, but rather that the records might contain information that
could lead to such a conclusion. Such a view has found little favor in most courts.
Despite this extensive case law under the FOIA, prior to the Blethen case, courts
in Maine had yet to address whether the central purpose doctrine was applicable to
cases falling under the FOAA's own personal privacy exemption. Only in limited
circumstances had Maine even addressed, albeit indirectly, whether personal privacy
interests could ever trump the FOAA's policy favoring disclosure. 92
IV. THE BLETHEN DECISION
In Blethen Maine Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 93 Blethen, the publisher of several
Maine newspapers, sought judicial review of the decision by the state Attorney
General, G. Steven Rowe, not to release records pertaining to his investigation of
alleged sexual abuse by eighteen deceased priests. 94 In June 2002, Blethen filed a
request, pursuant to the FOAA to view these records. 95 The Attorney General denied
the request, concluding that the records were designated confidential under the Maine
Criminal History Record Information Act (Criminal Record Act) because they would
both "[i]nterfere with law enforcement proceedings" and"[ c]onstitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." 96 Therefore, the Attorney General concluded that the
records Blethen sought were exempt from disclosure under the FOAA. 97
Blethen subsequently appealed to the Maine Superior Court (Kennebec County,
Studstrup, J.), 98 which agreed with the Attorney General's argument that "release of
these documents would interfere with law enforcement" because the Attorney
General's office had only had the documents for a short period of time and investigation into the records was ongoing. 99 However, the court declined to address the
Attorney General's second contention under the Criminal Record Act that the records
constituted an "unwarranted invasion of privacy." 100 The Superior Court retained
jurisdiction of the matter and entered an order providing for reexamination of the status

92. See Guy Gannett Publ'g Co. v. Univ. of Me., 555 A.2d 470,471 (Me. 1989)(addressing ME. REV.
STAT.ANN.tit. 5 § 7070(2)(A)(2002), a statute designating confidential medical files of public employees,
thus exempting such information from disclosure under the FOAA).
93. 2005 ME 56, 871 A.2d 523.
94. Id. ,r2, 871 A.2d at 525. The records at issue in this case were handed over to Attorney General
Rowe in May 2002 by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Portland. Kevin Wack, Paper Prevails in Lawsuit
Over Priests' Names, PORTLANDPRESSHERALD,Apr. 23, 2005, at Al. The Diocese had been collecting
allegations of abuse against priests and other clergy members for seventy-five years, but in most cases had
never reported these allegations to the Attorney General. Gregory D. Kesich, Court Questions Ruling on
Abuse Records, PORTLANDPRESSHERALD,May 14, 2004, at 18.
95. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, 1)3,871 A.2d at 525.
96. Id. ,r5,871 A.2d at 526 (applying ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 16, § 614(A), (C) (2006)). See supra
text accompanying note 31.
97. Id.
98. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, No. AP-02-43, 2002 WL 31360637, at *I (Me. Super. Ct.
Sept. 11, 2002).
99. Id. at *I. Although it appeared from the records that all the priests named were deceased, and thus
could not be prosecuted, the Attorney General explained that information in the records could possibly lead
to viable prosecutions or influence an ongoing investigation. Id.
100. Id.
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of the documents for law enforcement purposes six months from the date of the order
101
Although the Superior
to determine whether the investigation was still ongoing.
Court declined to decide whether release of the documents would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, the court did note that a decision on that point was
inevitable. 102 The court acknowledged that the decision would rest on a balancing test
which would weigh the privacy interests of the victims and perpetrators against the
public's right to be informed. 103 The court also acknowledged that the question of
whose privacy interests were at stake was a complicated one, as case law was not
104
entirely clear on whether privacy rights are extinguished upon death.
Subsequently, the Attorney General reported to the Superior Court that disclosure
105
of the records would no longer negatively affect the investigations. Thus, the parties
turned their attention to the personal privacy exemption issue that the court had not
reached in its earlier decision: whether release of the records would constitute an
106
After
"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" under the Criminal Record Act.
fully
be
a nontestimonial hearing, the Superior Court concluded that the records should
107
The State appealed to the Maine Law Court, which affirmed the lower
disclosed.
court's judgment to the extent that it ordered disclosure of the records, but vacated the
lower court's decision not to redact the names and identifying information of the
witnesses and victims contained in the records. 108 The court expressly held, however,
that the names of the deceased priests were not to be redacted. 109
On appeal, the State argued that there was clearly "a 'reasonable possibility' that
disclosure of [the records] would result 'in an unwarranted invasion of personal
110
privacy' of both the victims, their families and other witnesses" and the alleged
111
The State asserted that the applicable federal case law on the subject
perpetrators.
privacy exemption established that persons involved in investipersonal
of the FOIA's
gations have a substantial privacy interest in their involvement remaining confidential,
"even if they are not the subject of the investigation." 112 Further, the State argued that
where an investigation does not result in a public prosecution, the targets of that
investigation retain a privacy interest in the records remaining confidential, which
interest can extend after death. 113
The State also argued that the privacy interest encompassed by the Criminal
Record Act extends to close family members of deceased individuals whose names

IOI. Id. at *2.
102. Id. at *I.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, ,i 7, 871 A.2d 523,527.
106. Id.
107. Id. ,i 40,871 A.2d at 535.
108. Id. ,i 2, 698 A.2d at 535.
109. Id.
I 10. Briefof Appellants at5-6, Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56,871 A2d 523 (No.
KEN-03-697).
11I. Id. at 12.
112. Id. at 8 (quoting Davis v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
I 13. Id. at 13-14 (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.2d 20, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
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appear in government files. 114 Therefore, the State argued that the release of the
reports containing the identities of the deceased priests accused of child sexual abuse
would be an unwarranted invasion of both the deceased priests' and their family
members' personal privacy rights. 115
The State finally argued that the court below had erred in its application of the
FOAA balancing test as articulated in the Reporters Committee case, in that it
misconstrued the public policy goals behind the FOAA. 116 The State contended that
the lower court was misguided in its belief that the Catholic Church and the general
public had an interest in learning how the Diocese dealt with the allegations of child
sexual abuse and how to prevent similar incidents in the future, and that such interests
substantially outweighed any privacy right of named individuals. 117 Instead, the State
maintained that the public policy behind Maine's FOAA, like the federal FOIA,
focused "on the citizens' right to be informed with 'what their government is up to,"'
and that such a policy was not furthered by "disclosure of information about private
citizens that has accumulated in various governmental files but reveals nothing about
an agency's own conduct." 118 Because Blethen was not claiming any misconduct or
mismanagement on the part of law enforcement officials or the Attorney General's
office, the public policy concern was not as strong as the lower court had found, and
was thus unable to outweigh the personal privacy concerns of the victims, witnesses,
alleged perpetrators, and their families. 119
Blethen, on appeal, argued that based upon the FOAA's underlying public policy
and liberal rules of construction, 120 exceptions to disclosure are to be interpreted
narrowly. 121 Thus, interpretation of"personal privacy" by the Court required a narrow
reading falling within traditional notions of the concept. 122 Blethen contended that
under Maine law, personal privacy had been interpreted according to the standard for
the invasion of that right as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
provides that "an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living
individual whose privacy is invaded," and not "by other persons such as members of
the individual's family." 123 Blethen maintained that the Legislature could not have
intended to expand the common law meaning of personal privacy when it used that
term in the Criminal Record Act. Thus, Blethen argued that a deceased person has no

114. Id. at 14. (citing Favish v. Office oflndep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd
sub nom. Nat') Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004)) ("[T]he personal privacy in
the statutory exemption extends to the memory of the deceased held by those tied closely to the deceased
by blood or love.").
115. Id. at 15.
I 16. Id. at 15-16. For an explanation of the Reporters Committee balancing test, see supra text
accompanying notes 42-48.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Id. at 16(quoting U.S. Dep'tofJusticev. Reporters Comm. forFreedomofthe Press,489 U.S. 749,
773 (1989)).
119. Id. at 17.
120. Brief of Appellee at 6, Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, 871 A.2d 523 (No.
KEN-03-697). See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
121. Id. at 7-8 (citing Doe v. Dep't of Mental Health, 1997 ME 195, ,i 12,699 A.2d 422, and Guy
Gannett Publ'g Co. v. Univ. of Maine, 55 A.2d 470,471 (Me. 1989)).
122. Id. at 8.
123. Id. at 9 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OFTORTS§ 6251 cmt. a (1977)).
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right to personal privacy, nor can such an invasion be claimed on his behalf by family
members. 124 Blethen also cited authority from other jurisdictions similarly holding that
one's personal privacy interest is eliminated or at least greatly diminished by death. 125
Blethen argued that, in light of the extinguished or greatly reduced interest that a
deceased person has in his personal privacy rights, as well as the long-standing concept
that that right could not be asserted by family members, any such personal privacy
interest was greatly outweighed by the overwhelming interests in public disclosure. 126
In contrast to the State's argument that there was no compelling public interest within
the meaning of the FO AA, Blethen contended thatthe pub lie' s "interest in knowing the
extent to which information regarding alleged abusers was disclosed to the State, the
nature of the State's knowledge, the State's investigation, and the record on which the
State based the conclusions reached in its Report" far outweighed any existing privacy
interest. 127 Blethen did not specifically allege that it sought information that might
reveal government misconduct; however, this failure was most likely due to the fact
that Favish was decided subsequent to the filing of briefs by the parties in Blethen. 128
Instead, Blethen contended that a "public accounting" of the abuse scandal, including
a release of the names of those accused and what was done about the accusations,
would provide victims with some amount of vindication and closure and could
encourage other victims to come forward. 129 Thus, Blethen concluded that because of
these compelling public interests, the lower court correctly applied the FOAA
balancing test. Blethen argued in the alternative that, should the Law Court find that
any of the information contained in the records was exempt from disclosure under the
personal privacy exemption of the Criminal Record Act, that information should be
appropriately redacted allowing the remainder to be disclosed to the public. 130
The majority in the Blethen decision considered three factors in reaching its
decision: "(I) the personal privacy interests of the alleged victims, witnesses, and
deceased priests in maintaining the confidentiality of the records sought by Blethen;
(2) the public interest supporting disclosure of the records; and (3) the balancing of the
private and public interests." 131 Citing Reporters Committee, 132 and U.S. Department
of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 133 the court found that the personal
privacy concerns of the Criminal Record Act included an individual's interest in
avoiding public disclosure of personal matters as well as an interest in controlling how

124. Id. at 9-11.
125. Id. at 11-12 (citing Swickard v. Wayne County Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304,313 (Mich. 1991);
Diamond v. FBI, 707 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1975); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1257 (3d Cir.
1993); Ferguson v. FBI, 774 F. Supp. 815,825 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Rabbitt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 383 F.
Supp. 1065, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kyle v. United States, No. Civ-80-1038E, 1987 WL 13874(W.D.N.Y.
July 16, I 987)).
126. Id. at 14.
127. Id. at 15.
128. See Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, ,I 47,871 A.2d 523,537 (Saufley, C.J.,
concurring).
129. Brief of Appellee, supra note 120, at 16-17.
130. Id. at 25.
131. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,i 14,871 A.2d at 529.
132. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
133. 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
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personal information is disseminated to the public. 134 In considering the privacy
interests of the living persons (victims and witnesses) contained in the records, the
court reasoned that although many names had already been disclosed and none of the
information was obtained under the protection of the confessional or in another manner
that would lead the disseminator to have an expectation of complete confidentiality,
all personal privacy interests had not been extinguished. 135 The court further
acknowledged that where private individuals are named in a criminal investigation
report, "the privacy interest protected by the privacy exception is at its apex." 136
As for the privacy interests of the deceased priests and their family members, the
court acknowledged that it had "not previously considered whether the privacy
interests protected by the Criminal History Record Information Act continue after a
person's death." 137 The court noted, however, that the two federal circuit courts of
appeal that had considered the question had reached conflicting conclusions. 138 The
court then acknowledged that F avish had very recently settled the dispute between the
circuits by establishing that family members could assert their own privacy interests
in information about deceased relatives. 139 In evaluating the continuing privacy
interests of both the deceased priests and their living family members, the court
concluded that "[ o]ur in camera inspection of the records reveals that the passage of
time has substantially dissipated or extinguished the privacy interests of the deceased
priests, if any, and of their relatives." 14 Concluding that because the length of time
from both the alleged misconduct and the deaths of the priests was measured in
decades, "any residual privacy interests of the deceased priests and their immediate
family members in this case are, at most, minimal." 141 The court further emphasized
that the unique cultural interests implicated by grieving family members, which was
central to the holding in Favish, was not present here, and thus the court was not bound
to find that the priests' family members retained a strong privacy interest in the records
remaining confidential so many years after the deaths of the priests. 142
In examining the public interest in disclosure of the records, the court used the
central purpose doctrine developed in Reporters Committee. 143 Under the central
purpose doctrine, and mindful of the liberal construction to be given the FOAA, the
court found that the public's interest in understanding the Attorney General's decision
not to bring criminal charges during his investigation of child sexual abuse by priests
was encompassed by the "central purpose" of the FOAA. 144 In so doing, the court

°

134. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,r 15,871 A.2d at 529.
135. Id. ,r,I 19-21, 871 A.2d at 530.
136. Id. ,r 15,871 A.2d at 529.
137. Id. ,r23,871 A.2d at 531.
138. Id. (Comparing Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 33 (D.C. Cir. I 998)(concluding
that deceased persons do have residual reputation and family-related privacy interests) with McDonnell v.
United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1261 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that deceased persons have "no privacy
interest subject to invasion by disclosure")).
139. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,r23, 871 A.2d at 531.
140. Id. ,r24, 871 A.2d at 531.
141. Id. ,r,I24, 25, 871 A.2d at 531-32.
142. Id. ,r31, 871 A.2d at 533.
143. Id. ,r28, 871 A.2d at 532.
144. Id. ,r32, 871 A.2d at 533.
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expressly declined to find that the holding in Favish was applicable to the facts of this
case, stating that "[t]here is ... no basis in the text of the FOAA or the public policy
it implements to cause us to engraft Favish 's requirement of evidentiary proof of
governmental impropriety to justify the public disclosure of photographic images of
a corpse onto a request for written investigative files." 145 Further, the court emphasized
that the FOAA was to "be liberally construed and applied" to promote its underlying
policy of providing the public with information about what its government is up to, and
"[a]bsent the unique cultural and familial interests confronted in Favish, the public's
interest in knowing what its government is up to encompasses a broader universe of
concerns than simply the possibility of governmental wrongdoing." 146 The court
therefore concluded that Blethen's request would further a substantial public interest,
falling within the central purpose of the FOAA, and thus would warrant any resultant
invasion of personal privacy. 147
The final step taken by the court was to balance the private and public interests it
had found in the case. 148 The court found that the privacy interests of the deceased
priests and their families were minimal at most, but that the other individuals named
in the reports retained a substantial privacy interest in nondisclosure. 149 In an effort to
protect this interest, the court determined that all the identifying information of the
other private individuals could be effectively redacted from the records, thus greatly
reducing these individuals' privacy interests. 150 The court concluded that once this
redaction had been accomplished, the substantial public interest in disclosure would
outweigh any remaining personal privacy interests. 151
Chief Justice Saufley concurred, agreeing with the result reached by the court in
the majority opinion, but specifically disagreeing with the majority's refusal to apply
the evidentiary requirements crafted by the Supreme Court in F avish. 152 Instead, under
Chief Justice Saufley's assessment, Favish had set out the correct standard for the
treatment of requests for investigatory records under both the FOIA and the FOAA:
there should be a "prohibition on their release unless there are allegations and evidence
of government misconduct that warrant disclosure of the information." 153 In failing to
apply Favish, the concurrence argued that the court had improperly minimized the
historic distinction between general public records and criminal investigation
records. 154 Chief Justice Saufley emphasized that the Legislature did not intend that
investigatory records were to be presumed accessible to the public under Maine's
FOAA, as most other governmental records are. 155
Therefore, according to the concurrence, the real issue in the case was whether
Blethen had asserted a "credible allegation of governmental misconduct" on the part

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
15I.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. ,r31,871 A.2d at 533.
Id. ,r32,871 A.2d at 533-34.
Id. ,r35, 871 A.2d at 534.
Id. ,r36,871 A.2d at 534.
Id. ,r36, 871 A.2d at 534-35.
Id. ,r37, 871 A.2d at 535.
Id. ,r40, 871 A.2d at 535.
Id. ,r41,871 A.2d at 536 (Saufley, C.J., concurring).
Id. ,r45, 871 A.2d at 536.
Id. ,r42, 871 A.2d at 536.
Id. ,r43, 871 A.2d at 535.
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of the Attorney General for not pursuing criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetrators because under the Favish standard, the party urging disclosure must make a good
faith allegation of governmental misconduct supported by evidence. 156 Although the
concurrence acknowledged that Blethen had not specifically articulated such an
allegation in its complaint and briefs, it concluded that "the serious allegations of child
sexual abuse, involving many children, made or alleged to have occurred over decades,
without prosecution, is equivalent to an allegation of governmental misconduct in the
present case." 157
In so finding, the concurrence explained that because of the unique factual
circumstances of the case, such as the number of alleged victims and perpetrators and
the fact that all the priests named in the reports were deceased, this case "pose[ d]
special circumstances warranting greater flexibility in applying the FOAA analysis." 158
Chief Justice Saufley therefore found application of the Exemption 7(C) balancing test
appropriate in this case based on her view that Blethen had made a de facto assertion
of governmental misconduct and because of the unique circumstances of the case. In
working through this balancing test, the concurrence concluded that after redaction of
all identifying information of witnesses and alleged victims, the public's interest in the
records outweighed any remaining privacy interests. 159 The concurrence did
emphasize, however, that the unique facts of the case meant that the court's holding
had limited precedential force and would therefore not have a "chilling effect" on
future prosecutorial investigations. 160 It therefore appears that Chief Justice Saufley
believed Blethen had complied with theFavish evidentiaryrequirements implicitly, but
not explicitly, most likely as a result of the timing of the decision in Favish. 161
However, in the future, the concurrence would require faithful compliance with the
Favish standards in order for a party to adequately assert a public interest cognizable
under the FOAA. 162
Justice Clifford's dissent,joined by Justices Rudman and Alexander, argued that
both the majority and the concurrence had dramatically relaxed the standard for when
public dissemination of criminal investigative records was warranted. 163 First, the
dissenters emphasized that the language of the Criminal Record Act expressly exempts
criminal investigative records from disclosure pursuant to the FOAA as long as there
is a "reasonable possibility" that public release will "[c]onstitute an unwarranted
invasion ofprivacy." 164 Under this statutory framework, the dissenters argued that the
majority had erred in its assessment of what personal privacy interests still existed in
the information contained in the reports. 165 Second, the dissenters found that the
privacy interests of the witnesses and victims had not been greatly diminished or

156. Id. ,r 41 n.13, 871 A.2d at 537 n. 13 (citing Nat'I Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S.
157, 174 (2004)).
151. Id. ,r47, 871 A.2d at 537.
A.2dat537n.13.
158. Id.,r47n.13,871
159. Id. ,r 48,871 A.2d at 537.
160. Id. ,r49,871 A.2d at 537.
161. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
162. See id. ,r,r45-46, 871 A.2d at 536-37.
163. Id. ,r52,871 A.2d at 538 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
164. Id. ,r53,871 A.2d at 538-39 (citing ME. REV.STAT. ANN.tit. 16, § 614(l)(C) (2006)).
165. Id. ,r,r 58-59, 871 A.2d at 540.
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extinguished by the passage of time and the manner in which the incidents were
reported. 166 Instead, because much of the information contained in the reports had not
yet been publicly disclosed and most reports were made to the Diocese and not to
prosecutors, thus diminishing the likelihood that the disclosures were made with the
expectation of criminal prosecutions, the victims and witnesses whose statements
appeared in the reports retained strong personal privacy interests in non-disclosure of
this information. 167 Finally, the dissenters also found that the immediate family
members of the deceased priests did have residual privacy interests that had been
greatly reduced, but not completely extinguished, by the passage of time. 168
Because of these significant privacy interests, the dissent argued that disclosure
of the records was warranted only ifthere was a "significant public interest" in such
disclosure; otherwise, there was no balancing of interests to be done by the court. 169
The dissenters found that no such substantial public interest was present in this case. 170
According to Justice Clifford's dissent, because the central purpose of the FOAA is to
serve the public interest in determining governmental impropriety, "disclosure of
private information that implicates no wrongdoing on the part of a governmental entity
generates insufficient public interest and therefore falls well outside the scope and
application of FOAA." 171 Therefore, the dissent felt that the Favish requirements
should have been applied to this case; specifically, Blethen should have been required
"to produce evidence 'that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that ...
alleged Government impropriety might have occurred."' 172 The dissent also sought
to make it clear that general public interest in a criminal investigation does not fall
within the FOAA 's central purpose. 173 The dissent therefore concluded that because
Blethen did not specifically allege any governmental wrongdoing and because general
public curiosity does not meet the significant public interest standard warranting
disclosure of private records, the Attorney General should have prevailed. 174
Finally, the dissent found fault with the majority's decision to redact these names
simply because "it [was] neither impractical nor onerous to do so" and because "the
public interest [would] not be undermined by the redaction." 175 The dissent aired
concerns that such a holding would have serious implications for future police
investigations of crimes. 176 Specifically, the dissent feared that leaving the decision to
redact the names of witnesses and victims to "the broad discretion of a trial court" to
assess how impractical or onerous redaction would be, would have "the effect of
deterring the reporting of criminal activity out of fear that, even if prosecution is not

166. Id. ,I 58,871 A.2d at 540.
167. Id.
168. Id. ,I 59, 871 A.2d at 540.
169. Id.
170. Id. ,I 60, 871 A.2d at 540.
171. Id. ,i 63, 871 A.2d at 541 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 774 (1989)).
172. See id. ,i 65,871 A.2d at 542 (quotingNat'I Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157,
174 (2004)).
173. Id. ,I 64,871 A.2d at 541.
174. Id. ,i,I 66, 69, 871 A.2d at 542.
175. Id.
176. Id. ,I 67,871 A.2d at 542.
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initiated, humiliating and embarrassing events in personal lives may be revealed years
later." 177 Thus, the court's decision in this case to redact the names of victims and
witnesses was not enough to ensure that the privacy interests of those making such
reports in the future would be protected because the standard the majority set for
redaction was overly subjective and vague.
In a separate dissent, Justice Alexander emphasized his view that the court's
holding would cause serious changes in practices regarding the confidentiality of
criminal investigations. 178 Specifically, Alexander's dissent urged that the court's
holding implied that whenever a decision not to prosecute is made by the Attorney
General, ''the 'public interest' may be invoked to justify turnover of investigative
records to the press, and anyone else who asks." 179 This release would be made
"regardless of the risk of harm or embarrassment to victims, to individuals who may
have been wrongly or mistakenly accused, or to witnesses who have reported relevant
information." 180 The dissent therefore concluded that Blethen's success would, in fact,
work against the public interest and deter others from reporting crimes, especially
those of sexual abuse, because the protections afforded by court-ordered redaction
were "illusory" at best. 181
V. AN UNEASY BALANCE

None of the approaches utilized by the four opinions in Blethen strike an ideal
balance between protecting the privacy interests of victims and alleged perpetrators of
sexual abuse crimes and the public's right to know "what their government is up to."
The majority reached the correct conclusion in this case and came closest to
accomplishing this balance, yet its approach risks sending the message that the
guarantees of privacy to those reporting sexual abuse crimes are illusory at best. 182
First, the majority explained that in this case, because the victims voluntarily reported
their complaints and were not under the protection of the confessional, they had a
reasonable expectation that investigation, and thus disclosure of their identities, would
ensue. 183 In light of this, the majority concluded that the victims' interests in continued
privacy were reduced. 184 However, this conclusion failed to recognize that many
victims, especially of domestic or sexual abuse, voluntarily report their allegations but
do not wish for their identities and status as a victim to become an item of public
knowledge. 185 The majority therefore discounts the fact that although a victim who

177. Id. ,i,i 67-68, 871 A.2d at 542.
178. Id. ,i 70,871 A.2d at 542 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
179. Id. ,i 72, 871 A.2d at 543.
180. Id.
181. Id. W 73, 75, 871 A.2d at 543.
182. See id. ,i 75, 871 A.2d at 543.
183. Id. W20-21, 871 A.2d at 530 (majority opinion).
184. Id.
185. For an explanation of why protecting the identities of victims of crimes of sexual assault is
important, see Kimberly Kelley Blackburn, Identity Protection for Sexual Assault Victims: Exploring
Alternatives to the Publication of Private Facts Tort, 55 S.C. L. REv. 619, 621-22 (2004). The author
explains that policies in favor of protecting the identities of victims of sexual assault include the desire to
protect victims from further humiliation, sparing victims from the prevalent stigma that they contributed
to their attack, the idea that it is not a victims' responsibility to educate the public about the realities of
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reports sexual abuse may know that his identity will be contained in government
investigative files, he still maintains an interest in that information not being disseminated by the government to the general public, especially through media disclosure. 186 In the case of crimes of sexual abuse, victims often have a greater fear of
retaliation or public stigma. 187 The fear that such consequences will result may deter
victims from coming forward to report crimes of sexual abuse. The majority, in not
recognizing the substantiality of this privacy interest, failed to adequately protect the
profound government interest in encouraging the prompt and open reporting of crimes
and the need to protect victims and witnesses from harm for so doing.
The failure of the majority to give sufficient weight to the profound privacy
interests of victims of sexual abuse would not, however, be so troublesome had it also
adopted a stronger standard for redaction that would more adequately protect victims
and witnesses reporting sexual abuse. This it failed to do. The majority stated that
although the victims and witnesses named in the investigative reports retained strong
privacy interests, those interests could be significantly reduced by redacting all
identifying information from the records sought. 188 The majority, however, qualified
this statement by saying that redaction was appropriate here because it would be
neither "impractical nor onerous. " 189 However, as both dissents asserted,190 such a
subjective standard leaves victims and witnesses who report crimes with absolutely no
assurance that their names will not soon become matters of public knowledge. Instead,
the majority should have taken this opportunity in Blethen to establish a presumption
in favor of redaction of the names of sexual assault victims, making redaction
mandatory in all but the exceptional case. 191
Both dissents adequately stated the dangers of such subjective and vague criteria
for court-ordered redaction. First, the dissents asserted that the "impractical nor
onerous" standard would have the effect of chilling reporting of crimes. 192 This risk

sexual assault, physical protection of victims from retribution or further harm, increasing the reporting of
crimes and the number of arrests, encouraging participation in court proceedings, and protecting the
victim's sense of self. Id. For the opposing view, see Sarah Henderson Hutt, In Praise of Public Access:
Why the Government Should Disclose the Identities of Alleged Crime Victims, 41 DUKEL.J. 368 ( 1991).
The author argues that a historical analysis favors the public's right to access the identity of a victim of any
crime, and that nondisclosure ofa victim's identity is not desirable because many victims do not wish to
remain anonymous based on their desire to raise social awareness, that nondisclosure perpetuates the stigma
of being a rape victim because of the special treatment afforded victims of this crime, and that maintaining
the confidentiality of the victim but not of the accused is unfair to the accused's right to a fair trial and
presumption of innocence. Id at 370, 397-99.
186. SeP Blackbum, supra note 185, at 639 (advocating the enactment of legislation that prevents
disclosure by the government ofa sexual assault victim's identity to the press).
187. Blackbum, supra note 185, at 621-22.
188. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,r39,871 A.2d at 535.
189. Id
190. Id. ,r 67, 871 A.2d at 542 (Clifford, J., dissenting); ,r 75, 871 A.2d at 543 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting).
191. For the view that legislatures should enact statutory measures, such as consistent use of pseudonyms
in court room documents and proceedings and systematic redaction of names from police and court
documents, in order to protect sexual assault victims' identity, see Blackbum, supra note 185, at 637-38.
192. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,r 64, 871 A.2d at 541 (Clifford, J., dissenting); ,r 73, 871 A.2d at 543
(Alexander, J., dissenting).
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of quelling the reporting and investigation of crimes as heinous as sexual abuse should
not be taken lightly. Also, in arguing that this redaction standard would fail to
adequately protect the privacy interests of all those named in investigative records, 193
the dissenters recognized the true value at stake in cases addressing the personal
privacy exemption of the FOAA in relation to victims of sexual abuse: the power to
disclose information should lie with the victim; thus, only those victims who have
voluntarily reported their allegations to the public should have a reduced or extinguished privacy interest in nondisclosure of investigative records concerning such
allegations. 194 Therefore, the dissent was correct in arguing that personal information
appearing in investigative records should be redacted as a matter of course prior to
disclosure, no matter how impractical or onerous.
However, the majority did establish a commendable and novel standard for
evaluating what public interests fall within the FOAA' s central purpose and thus weigh
in favor of disclosure. 195 The majority found no reason to graft the requirements
established in Favish, regarding the need for the requestor to produce evidence of
governmental misconduct, onto Maine's FOAA. 196 The majority declared that the
central purpose of the FOAA encompassed more than the public's right to learn of
governmental misconduct; instead, it included the right of the public to know about
governmental activity in general, good or bad, especially when that activity was one
of significant interest to an informed citizenry. 197 Thus, the majority sets a lower bar
than federal law in defining the standard requestors must meet to establish a substantial
public interest in disclosure of records. The majority implicitly recognized that
citizens may have a legitimate interest in all the workings of their government, not just
those that are corrupt or questionable. Although the majority does not intimate
whether evidence of such government activity must appear in the complaint, or whether
such a standard would permit claims for information based on a derivative use
argument, the majority did take an important step in strengthening the public's right
to be informed about the workings of its government.
The concurrence criticized the majority's rejection of the requirements of Favish,
stating that "in the absence of an allegation of governmental wrongdoing, the interests
in protection of the witnesses, alleged victims, informants, and others who have been
the subject of investigation would outweigh the public's interest in disclosure." 198
Although the concurrence concluded that Blethen 's complaint contained the equivalent
of such an allegation of government misconduct, 199 this standard is unduly restrictive
of the public's right to be informed about the actions of the government in other, less
sensational instances.
Both dissents also strongly questioned the wisdom of expanding the concept of
public interest under the FOAA, as the majority arguably did in finding the Favish

193. Id. ,i 67, 871 A.2d at 542 (Clifford, J., dissenting); ,i 75, 871 A.2d at 543 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting).
194. See id. ,i 56, 871 A.2d at 539.
195. Id. ,i 32, 871 A.2d at 533 (majority opinion).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. ,i 46,871 A.2d at 536-37 (Saufley, C.J., concurring).
199. Id. ,i 47, 871 A.2d at 537.
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principles inapplicable. 200 However, their approaches misinterpreted the majority's
analysis. The majority did not assert that when ''the subject [of an investigation] has
become the focus of public attention or concern" dis!=losureof investigative records
would be automatically compelled. 201 The diss~nts' fears that the majority's interpretation of public interest would render the personal privacy exemption ineffective was
misplaced because the dissents failed to recognize that the requestors must still be
seeking information about government activity, and not just matters of"general public
interest. " 202 Further, the dissenters failed to consider that the majority's only mistake
might have been its failure to craft a stronger redaction standard, and not its expansion
of the concept of public interest under the FOAA. In other words, ihe dissent did not
acknowledge that a more protective redaction standard could serve as a valuable
counter-weight to the expanded concept of public interest found by the majority when
the court is called upon to balance the public and private interests at stake under the
personal privacy exemption to the FOAA.
Although all four opinions asserted divergent and conflicting views, together they
illustrate that in Maine and Federal courts alike, the balancing act that must be done
under freedom of information Jaws is a high-wire one. The task of weighing the
public's right to be informed against the general citizen's right to privacy is a crucial
one and defines the very nature of qemocracy. The complexity of this issue is clear
from numerous opinions issued by the court in Blethen, and will undoubtedly continue
to be so in the near future as similar cases enter the courthouse.

200. Id. 'II 64, 871 A.2d at 541 (Clifford, J., dissenting);
dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id. 'II64,871 A.2d at 541 (Clifford, J., dissenting).

'If72, 871 A.2d at 543 (Alexander,
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